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R.EcULAnoN OF BusINEss-REsALB ProCB MAINtBNANCB-CoNSTITUTION·
OP NoN-SIGNBR PRovxsION IN MxcmcAN FAIR TRADB AC'I'-Plaintiff, a
manufacturer of trade-marked products, brought a bill to restrain defendantretailer from selling plaintiff's products at prices below the minimum prices
established by plaintiff in contracts made pursuant to the Michigan Fair Trade
Act.1 Defendant admitted such sales; but contended that because it had not
signed a fair trade agreement with plaintiff, enforcement of the Michigan act
against defendant would violate its rights under the due process clause of the
state constitution.2 The trial court, treating the transactions involved as being
exclusively in intrastate commerce, held the Michigan Fair Trade Act, as applied
to non-signers of fair trade agreements, unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law. On appeal, held, affirmed. The non-signer
provision in the Michigan Fair Trade Act is beyond the scope of the state police
power inasmuch as it bears no reasonable relation to public morals, health, safety
or the general welfare. Justices Butzel and Reid dissented as to this ground for
decision. Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334
Mich. 109, 54 N.W. (2d) 268 (1952).
ALITY

1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §445.151 et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1951 Cum. Supp.)
§19.321 et seq.
2 MICH. CoNST. (1908) art. 2, §16.
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During the past two decades, resale price maintenance of trade-marked and
branded products under state fair trade acts has become an integral feature of
the national economy.3 The movement for state fair trade acts gained impetus
from economic conditions during the depression of the 1930's and won federal
sanction in the 1936 Supreme Court decision, Old Dearborn Distributing Co.
17. Seagram Distillers Corp.4 and in the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937.5 Although
there are slight variations in the state legislation,6 the core of the statutory fair
trade system, and also the principal target for legal objection, lies in the nonsigner provision by which price-cutting dealers, wholesale or retail, may be en·
joined from selling below the established price even though they are not parties
to an agreement with the manufacturer. Recent attack upon the non-signer
provision on the federal level won tempbrary victory in the Supreme Gourt holding that the Miller-Tydings Act did not immunize the non-signer provision
against charges under the Sherman Act, 7 but Congress quickly closed this breach
in the fair trade system by passing the McGuire Act 8 The decision in the
principal case, and a similar recent holding in Florida,9 suggest, however, that
the constitutional issues surrounding fair trade legislation bear re-examination.
At present, Michigan and Florida are alone in finding their fair trade statutes
uncoristitutional,10 but the change in economic conditions since the 1930's may
well prompt relitigation of the question. 11 The more or less uniform constitutional rationale for fair trade legislation proceeds upon the rather questionable
assumption that its primary purpose is to protect the good will of the producer of
a Only Missouri, Texas, Vermont and the District of Columbia have failed to enact
fair trade acts. For table of state fair trade acts, see 3 CALLMANN, Um.AIR CoMP.BTITION
AND TRADB·MABxs 1764 (1945).
4 299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139 (1936), holding the non-signer provision :in the Illinois
Fair Trade Act valid under the Federal Constitution.
5 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§1-7. This federal enabling statute excepted from the operation
of the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act vertical contracts setting minimum resale prices on trade-marked articles so long as such contracts were valid under state
law.
6 For a comparison of the different types of statutes, see 1 CALLMANN, Um.AIR CoM•
PETITION AND TRADB-MAnxs 361, and model statutes in 3 CALLMANN at p. 1759 (1945).
7 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Dist. Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951).
8 H.R. 5767, approved as P.L. 542, July 14, 1952. This act removes the non-signer
provision from the operation of the Sherman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act, and
would seem to foreclose further attack on the fair trade system on a federal level, except
perhaps under the Fifth Amendment due process clause. But see comment in 8 Umv.
Cm. L. RBv. 745 (1941) for an'interesting discussion of the legal possibilities in regarding
some vertical fair trade agreements as little more than a facade for otherwise illegal horizontal agreements among retailers.
9 Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Dist. Corp., (Fla. 1949) 40 S. (2d) 371.
lO For state authority to the contrary, see cases collected in 19 A.L.R. (2d) II39
(1951).
11 The Florida court indicated that changed economic conditions cast a new light on
the question, case cited in note 9, supra, at 374 and 382. But see W. A. Scheaffer Pen
Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45 S. (2d) 838 (1950), and Frankfort Dist. Corp. v. Liberto,
190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W. (2d) 971 (1950), where the courts noted the Florida dissent
from the majority position but aligned themselves with the majority.
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trade-marked goods from the harmful effects of an erratic retail price structure.12
Since this good will remains the property of the producer despite the sale of
individual trade-marked items to the retailer, it is considered reasonable and
consonant with due process to permit the producer to establish price restrictions
and enforce them even against non-signers.13 The non-signer is bound by these
price restrictions, not because of any legislative delegation of price-fixing power
to the producer, but rather because of the harm that price-cutting might do to
the producer's good will.14 The Michigan court, in rejecting this ingenious,
though rather oblique, line of reasoning, takes the position that the need for a
reasonable relation to the general welfare is not satisfied simply by finding a
property interest at stake, for no property interest is absolute, and further, that
legislation which has the effect of impairing the non-signer's freedom to cut
prices in retail competition bears no reasonable relation to the general welfare. 15
While the Michigan decision frames the issue in more realistic terms, inherent
in the decision is a socio-economic policy judgment that the general welfare is
better served by unrestricted competition on the retail level. Whatever the present economic merits of the fair trade system,16 it would seem that the legislature, possessing more adequate means to ascertain the facts as well as a closer
contact with the economic needs of society, should be the forum for such reevaluation.17 The extent to which legislative regulation of the economy should
be submitted to the vague test of due process is, of course, a question of degree,
but it is submitted that the Michigan decision represents a marked departure
from the prevailing theory that the legislature should enjoy wide discretion in
determining what serves the general welfare, so long as there is in fact a divergency of reasonable opinion on the problem.18 Under the principal decision,
12 Justice Sutherland in the Old Dearborn decision, note 4 supra, at 193, apparently
adopted this position from language in Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 ill. 559, 2
N.E. (2d) 929 (1936), and Max Factor and Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P.
(2d) 177 (1936), but the history of fair trade legislation seems to compel the conclusion
that the real purpose of the legislation was the desire of some retailers to prevent pricecutting and the use of the "loss leader." 49 YALE L.J. 145 (1939).
lS The price restriction ran with and conditioned the acquisition of the goods much
like an equitable servitude on land, Old Dearborn decision, note 4 supra, at 194. And see
Max Factor and Co. v. Kunsman, note 12 supra, at 464, for an analogy to legislative
protection against the tort of malicious interference with contract relations.
14 For an extended analysis of the constitutional arguments for fair trade legislation,
see 47 Mi:cH. L. RBv. 821 (1949), and 45 ILL. L. Rl!v. 378 (1950).
15 Principal case at 113 and 115.
.
16 Competing arguments and statistics may be found in "The Not-So-Fair Trade Laws,"
FoRTUNE MAGAZINE 70, January, 1949; "A Chance for Really Fair Trade," FoRTCJNB
MAGAZINE 79, March, 1952; debate attending the passage of the McGuire Act, CoNG. RBc.
82d Cong., 2d. sess., July 1, 1952, beginning at 8907, and July 2, 1952 beginning at 9086;
and the extended study, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION ON RBsALE PmcB
MAlNTENANCB, Dec. 13, 1945.
17 See Butzel, J., in his dissent in the principal case at 121-122.
1s Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934), and Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251 (1949).
This would seem to be the underlying motivation in decisions upholding the fair trade
acts. See cases cited, notes 11 and 12 supra.
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there appears to be little chance for a legislative revival of the fair trade system
in Michigan.19
Richard D. Rohr, S.Ed.

19 The Florida legislature attempted to obviate their Supreme Court's adverse holding
by enacting a prefatory fact-finding statement that this statute did serve the general welfare,
but the court has thus far avoided a ruling on this change. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v.
Ben Greene Inc., (Fla. 1951) 54 S. (2d) 235.

